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The problem with ‘radicalization’, the remit of ‘Prevent’, 
and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK 
By Anthony Richards 
 
Introduction 
On 7th July 2010 International Affairs, the BBC’s World Tonight, and the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) hosted a conference at 
Chatham House, London entitled ‘The London bombings five years on: 
reflections on the future of counterterrorism’, and a Special Issue of 
International Affairs was published to mark the anniversary.1 The previous day, 
the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the ESRC hosted a joint 
workshop ‘Radicalization: Applying the lessons from research’. Both events 
were interesting and informative but in a way that revealed an uncomfortable 
truth: that we don’t know, nor, it appears, are we ever likely to know, why some 
young men resort to violent extremism and others do not. Nor, it seems, has 
there been any consistent notion as to what is meant by ‘radicalization’, with the 
last five years providing a legacy of confusion as to what forms of 
‘radicalization’ should be the focus of a counter-terrorism strategy.  
The following argues that we should now question the utility of using 
‘radicalization’ as the focus of response. Because its use logically implies that 
there should be a ‘counter-radicalization’ response it has helped to facilitate a 
‘Prevent’ strand that has confusingly oscillated between tackling violent 
extremism in particular to promoting community cohesion and ‘shared values’ 
more broadly. Thus, while there have been significant tactical successes in 
thwarting terrorist attacks since 7/7, this lack of clarity as to who the radicalized 
are and what Prevent is precisely supposed to address has left a sense of 
strategic drift. This article argues that the focus of counter-terrorism strategy 
should be on countering terrorism and not on the broader remit implied by 
wider conceptions of radicalization. This is certainly not to diminish the 
importance of contextual or ‘root cause’ factors behind terrorism, but, if it is 
terrorism that is to be understood and countered, then such factors should be 
                                                            
1 International Affairs, Volume 86, Number 4, July 2010. 
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viewed within the terrorism - counter-terrorism discourse and not a 
radicalization – counter-radicalization one.        
 
The Problem with ‘Radicalization’ 
Rather than being an abstract exercise of little practical utility, and if a concept 
like radicalization has been used as the focus for response, establishing what is 
meant and understood by it, and what its parameters are, is imperative if 
responses are not to become confused or convoluted. Yet, this is precisely what 
has happened. It has been unclear as to who the ‘radicalized’ refers to, and as a 
result the remit of counter-terrorism or ‘counter-radicalization’ has also lacked 
clarity.  Of course, radicalization is itself a derivative of radical which is 
actually seen as positive in many contexts – for example, our mainstream 
political parties often boast of radical manifestos. It is also worth noting that we 
didn’t use the term radicalization in Northern Ireland as the terrorist threat 
emerged there in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Indeed, ‘as late as the early 
2000’s, hardly any reference to radicalization could be found in the academic 
literature on terrorism and political violence’.2 
 
Who, then, are the radicalized? Are they just those who engage in violent 
extremism (and here one might prefer to use the term violent radicalization). Or 
are they also those who support violent extremism, or those who understand 
why people become violent? Are they those who disapprove of violent 
extremism in this country but who support the Taliban in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan? Demos, for example, in recent empirical research of what it called 
‘non-violent radicals’ and young Muslims in general, found that there was 
widespread support among such radicals and young Muslims for Iraqi and 
Afghan people ‘defending themselves’ from ‘invaders’.3 
 
The Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), based in the 
Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, undertook qualitative research that 
included eleven focus groups and ten in-depth interviews of British Pakistani, 
                                                            
2 Neumann, P., Introduction, Perspectives on Radicalization and Political Violence, International Centre for the 
Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, January 2008, p. 3, available at: 
http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1234516938ICSRPerspectivesonRadicalization.pdf . 
3 Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J., King, M., the edge of violence, a radical approach to extremism, Demos, April 16th 
2010, p.11, available at: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Edge_of_Violence_-_web.pdf?1271346195 (accessed on 
August 4th 2010).  
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Bangladeshi and Somali people and found that: ‘Whilst they might reject the 
means adopted by terrorists, they sympathised with the causes [injustice and 
oppression faced by Muslims around the world] allegedly espoused by terrorists 
and felt they had legitimate grievances’.4 Are these people radicalized? Are 
people radicalized if they think that Islam is incompatible with democracy, or if 
they disapprove of the use of violence but strive for the application of sharia law 
in the UK, or support the idea of an Islamic caliphate?5 To what extent, then, is 
the focus just on behaviour or is there also a focus on ideas and what people 
think? 
 
Interestingly, Contest 2, the latest version of the UK’s counter-terrorist strategy, 
has defined radicalization as ‘the process by which people come to support 
violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups’.6 This definition 
implies that radicalization is inextricably linked to violence. Yet Demos noted 
that ‘the last decade in particular has also seen a growth in many types of what 
it called non-violent radicalization’ [italics added] and argued that ‘a successful 
counter-terrorism strategy must be based on a clear understanding of these 
distinct forms of radicalization’.7 
 
If the indeterminate scope of radicalization (and therefore of counter-
radicalization) serves to confuse what the remit of response should be, neither 
does the use of the term add value as to why people become terrorists or what 
the trajectory into terrorism might be. Just as there is no one path into terrorism, 
there are no commonly understood metrics for radicalization that may give 
some clue as to when and why individuals cross the threshold from holding 
                                                            
4 RICU, ‘Counter-terror message testing’, March 2010,  p. 3, available at: 
http://tna.europarchive.org/20100419081706/http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-
search/comms-with-public-and-partners/RICU-research/counter-terror-message-testing?view=Binary (accessed 
August 4th 2010). The 11 focus groups consisted of 6 or 7 individuals each and included men and women aged 
between 18-55 from ‘a range of social and educational backgrounds’. The research was completed in April 2008 
and was carried out in Bradford, Birmingham and London. 
5 The Demos report noted above (note 3) found that ‘Certain ideas which are sometimes associated with 
terrorism were, in fact, held by large numbers of people who renounced terrorism. Many radicals, and indeed 
young Muslims, supported the application of Sharia law and the Caliphate — but usually in an aspirational or 
nostalgic sense’, p. 11. 
6 ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare’, The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’, 
March 2009, p. 11, available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100418065544/http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-
publications/publication-search/contest/contest-strategy/contest-strategy-2009?view=Binary (accessed August 
4th 2010). 
7 The Demos report (note 3) describes non-violent radicalization as ‘the process by which 
individuals come to hold radical views in relation to the status quo but do not undertake, or directly aid or abet 
terrorist activity’ (p. 8).  
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‘radical’ views into becoming violent extremists. Githens-Mazer and Lambert 
cite the case of two brothers, where, due to the greater exposure to ‘key ideas 
and concepts’, it would appear that one of the brothers would be more likely to 
cross this threshold when in fact it was the other brother that attempted to 
commit a terrorist attack. ‘Conventional wisdom’ on radicalization, they argue, 
fails to explain why ‘identity issues and exposure to ‘extremist’ ideas’ are 
causal factors in one case but not the other.8 But why use ‘radicalization’ as the 
focus of attention instead of terrorism? The former is commonly referred to as a 
process9 but individual engagement with terrorism has also been viewed as 
such.10 While there is, therefore, little discernible added value in using 
‘radicalization’ to enhance our knowledge as to why people become terrorists, it 
has, however, served to blur the counter-terrorist response. For, while becoming 
a terrorist should unequivocally be of concern to those engaged in counter-
terrorism, becoming ‘radicalized’ may not necessarily be.  
 
This is not to argue that ‘radicalization’ cannot or does not lead to terrorism or, 
indeed, to deny that becoming a terrorist is itself, of course, a form of 
radicalization. Moreover, the notion that the focus for counter-terrorism should 
be narrower than that implied by radicalization is certainly not to diminish the 
importance of contextual or root ‘cause’ factors in understanding why terrorism 
takes place. But, as it is terrorism that we should be concerned with, then these 
factors should be considered for their causal impact on terrorism, or on why 
somebody becomes a terrorist, and not on broader and more opaque notions of 
radicalization.11 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 Githens-Mazer, J., and Lambert, R., ‘Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails’, International Affairs, 
Vol. 86, No. 4, July 2010, p. 894. 
9 See, for example: European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalization, Radicalization Processes 
Leading to Acts of Terrorism, May 15th 2008, available at: 
http://www.rikcoolsaet.be/files/art_ip_wz/Expert%20Group%20Report%20Violent%20Radicalization%20FIN
AL.pdf (accessed August 21st 2010); Ackerman G., ‘Homegrown Radicalization in the West’, Peace and 
Security Summit, International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, June 30th-July 1st 
2010, summary available at: 
http://www.icsr.info/events/conferences/downloads/1280838419HomegrownRadicalizationintheWest.pdf 
(accessed August 21st 2010). 
10 See, for example, Taylor and Horgan’s work on terrorism as a process in Taylor, M., and Horgan, J., A 
‘Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist’, Terrorism 
and Political Violence, Vol. 18, No. 4, December 2006, pp. 585-601. 
11 See, for example, Crenshaw, M., ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July, 
1981) and Bjorgo, T.,(ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism, Routledge, 2005. 
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The Remit of Prevent 
 
Because being radicalized has often been perceived as the way people think as 
well as the way they act, it has helped to facilitate a convoluted response that 
has oscillated between the more narrow goal of preventing violent extremism 
and the much wider aspiration of promoting societal cohesion and ‘shared 
values’, embodied in the broad remit of Prevent. These wider goals are not be 
confused, however, with engaging with communities in general in order to 
counter terrorist threats, and in countering the narrative of violence that Al 
Qaeda preaches – both key elements of a counter-terrorist response but very 
different to the wider goals of societal cohesion and shared values respectively.    
The broad remit of Prevent is not something that has recently emerged. 
Although it has undergone adaptations and a wider focus in recent times, the 
July 2006 counter-terrorist strategy document, which was the culmination of the 
government’s long term counter-terrorist strategic thinking from early 2003, 
itself laid the seeds for the ambiguity surrounding precisely what it was 
supposed to achieve. The document argued that ‘the first area of action to 
counter radicalization lies in addressing structural problems in the UK and 
elsewhere that may contribute to radicalization’.12  
It placed firm emphasis on tackling ‘disadvantage’ and ‘inequalities’, and 
improving Muslim educational performance, employment opportunities, and 
housing conditions. It also stressed the need for increasing community cohesion 
and strengthening community integration through, for example, the formation 
(in June 2006) of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion which was to 
tackle segregation, barriers to cohesion and integration, and to work out how 
local communities can be ‘empowered to tackle extremist ideologies’.13 
The assumption appeared to be that tackling longstanding structural issues to do 
with equality, integration and societal cohesion would help to resolve the 
terrorist problem. While there was a robust defence of the UK’s role abroad in 
the strategy there was very little explicit acknowledgement of the impact of US 
and UK foreign policy on domestic security.  The sense in the document was 
that, through the aim of addressing these internal ‘structural’ issues, there was 
an impetus towards internalising the sources of radicalization. To take this 
                                                            
12 ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’, July 2006, p. 11, available at: 
http://tna.europarchive.org/20100419081706/http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-
search/contest/contest-strategy-2006?view=Binary (accessed August 5th 2010) 
13 ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’, July 2006 (note 12). 
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further one could argue, therefore, that the genesis for such a broad remit for 
‘Prevent’ lay in being in denial about the impact of foreign policy on the 
domestic terrorist threat and in fostering the belief in the significance of internal 
factors as underpinning radicalization.  
A good example of how this broader remit for Prevent has subsequently been 
disseminated by the government has been in its guidance for the Higher 
Education sector in relation to violent extremism. In January 2008 ‘Promoting 
good campus relations, fostering shared values and preventing violent 
extremism in Universities and Higher Education Colleges’ was produced. 14 
Although, at the time of writing, this is the current guidance (available on the 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills website) the previous Labour 
government had produced a further document in February 2009 entitled: ‘The 
Role of Further Education Colleges in Preventing Violent Extremism: Next 
Steps’. The document argued that:  
 
‘Absolutely key to this effort [of enabling communities ‘to resist 
extremist influence and root out terrorism’] is our quest to develop our 
sense of shared values: the values that bind communities together. These 
values belong to everyone in Britain ... it is absolutely critical that 
institutions embody these values of openness, free debate and 
tolerance’.15 
 
A commitment to shared values, championed by former Communities Secretary 
Hazel Blears, was now too seen as an integral part of responding to terrorism. 
The guidance also announced the formation of the ‘Community Cohesion and 
Preventing Violent Extremism Champion Principals Group’ which was to ‘build 
a greater awareness of the potential contribution that the FE college sector can 
make to promoting community cohesion and preventing violent extremism in all 
its forms.’16 And the report that described the responses of the consultation 
process (that preceded the ‘Next Steps’ report) was entitled ‘The Role of 
                                                            
14Available at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/corporate/migratedd/publications/e/extremismhe.pdf 
(accessed August 5th 2010). 
15 ‘The Role of Further Education Colleges in Preventing Violent Extremism: Next Steps’, February 2009, p. 3, 
available at:http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/corporate/migratedD/publications/1/17193_DIUS_Next_Steps 
(accessed August 6th 2010). 
16 ‘The Role of Further Education Colleges in Preventing Violent Extremism: Next Steps’, February 2009, p. 3 
(note 15). 
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Further Education Providers in Promoting Community Cohesion, Fostering 
Shared Values and Preventing Violent Extremism’.17 
 
One of the respondents in this consultation process, the Runnymede Trust, 
raised the concern that preventing violent extremism and community cohesion 
were being conflated and noted ‘the ease with which the notion of community 
cohesion has become intertwined with the wider Government priority of 
combating violent extremism’. It also argued that as a result there was a danger 
of ‘community cohesion being seen as something that only specific ethnic or 
faith groups would be required to do’ and it ‘would fully recommend 
dissociation between the concepts of cohesion and prevention of terrorism if 
positive inter-cultural and interfaith work is to practically occur’.18 
  
The Communities and Local Government Select Committee, in its assessment 
of Prevent, was also critical, questioning the:  
 
‘appropriateness of the Department of Communities and Local 
Government – a Government department which has responsibility for 
promoting cohesive communities – taking a lead role in counter-terrorism 
initiatives. Prevent risks undermining positive cross-cultural work on 
cohesion and capacity building to combat exclusion and alienation in 
many communities.’19 
 
The Committee also argued that ‘There is a sense that Government has sought 
to engineer a ‘moderate’ form of Islam, promoting and funding only those 
groups which conform to this model’.20 As a corollary to promoting ‘shared 
values’ counter-terrorism has also therefore been concerned with strengthening 
mainstream voices while apparently denying funding to others. This raises a 
serious difficulty for those who believe that there is merit in the idea that 
                                                            
17 Consultation report, February 2009, available at 
http://www.education.gov.uk/consultations/downloadableDocs/FE_violent_extremism_consultation_response.p
df (accessed August 5th 2010). 
18 The Runnymede Trust, ‘The Runnymede Trust Response To The Role of Further Education Providers in 
Promoting Community Cohesion, Fostering Shared Values and Preventing Violent Extremism’, May 6th 2008, 
available at: http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/policyResponses/ComCohesionFE_response.pdf  
(accessed August 5th 2010). 
19 Communities and Local Government Committee, Preventing Violent Extremism, March 30th 2010, p. 3, 
available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf (accessed 
August 16th 2010). 
20 Communities and Local Government Committee, Preventing Violent Extremism, March 30th 2010, p. 4, (note 
19). 
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effective radical (but non violent) channels of political expression need to be 
developed as alternative avenues to violent extremism. The Demos report 
referred to above, for example, argued that, ‘non violent radicals might 
sometimes be powerful allies’ and from its research noted that (although there 
are limits to what self-policing can achieve) ‘some in the community, including 
radicals, have come into contact with individuals contemplating violent acts, 
and successfully dissuaded them.’21 It argued, moreover, that: 
 
‘al-Qaeda inspired terrorism in the West shares much in common with 
other counter-cultural, subversive groups of predominantly angry young 
men. Being radical and rebelling against the received values of the status 
quo is an important part of being young. Ways must be found to ensure 
that young people can be radical, dissenting, and make a difference, 
without it resulting in serious or violent consequences ... Government and 
Muslim community groups should create and encourage programmes that 
offer exciting alternatives to al-Qaeda. A significant proportion of young 
Muslims — like many young people — will want to dissent and rebel, 
and the idea of being part of an international jihadi movement can be 
exhilarating. Governments must be more radical and daring in devising 
ways of engaging young people in non-violent alternatives that respond to 
this desire.’22 
The idea of opening up radical but non violent avenues for political expression 
again questions the utility of the term ‘radicalization’ (and broader conceptions 
of it) as the focus of a counter-terrorism response. Perhaps the empirical 
research of Horgan best illustrates this. Arguing for the need for greater 
conceptual clarity, he found that:  
‘the disengaged terrorist may not necessarily be ... ‘deradicalized’ at all ... 
In fact, in the sample of former terrorists I interviewed from 2006 to 
2008, while almost all of the interviewees could be described as 
disengaged, the vast majority of them could not be said to be 
‘deradicalized.’23  
                                                            
21 Demos, p. 12 (note 3). 
22 Demos, p. 15 (note 3). 
23 Horgan, J., ‘Individual disengagement: a psychological analysis’, in Bjorgo, T., and Horgan, J., Leaving 
Terrorism Behind, Routledge 2009, p. 27. 
9 
 
Thus, what in counter-terrorism and security terms could be seen as a success 
would in deradicalization (or counter-radicalization) terms be seen as an abject 
failure. Yet, in preventing violent extremism it is surely the former that we 
should be concerned with.  
If the wider remit of Prevent has been problematic for those engaged in 
community cohesion, one might expect that there has been some kind of trade-
off in favour of counter-terrorism. Yet, going beyond terrorism or violent 
extremism and towards radicalization as a focus for response has, for many, 
stigmatised communities who may have little sympathy for violent extremism. 
The CLG Select Committee, having received over seventy responses in its 
research on the effectiveness of Prevent, warned that: 
 
‘Allegations of ‘spying’, ‘intelligence gathering’ and ‘surveillance’ under 
the Prevent programme are widespread’ and that ‘Muslim communities 
have felt unfairly targeted and branded as potential terrorists. The strategy 
has contributed to a sense of frustration and alienation amongst Muslims 
which may increase the risk of making some individuals more vulnerable 
to radicalization.’24 
 
The Demos report above argued that ‘Assuming that radical views constitute the 
base of the terrorist pyramid can allow for counter-radicalization strategies 
against large numbers of people who object entirely to al Qaeda’s methods’.25 In 
response to the government’s guidance to Universities and Higher Education 
colleges one Deputy Vice Chancellor was concerned that the proposals tended 
to ‘set Muslims apart as having a particular propensity for violent extremism’26, 
while the Demos report concluded that: 
 
 
‘...mission drift must be avoided. Prevention work should be limited to 
interventions where there is a clear, identified danger of groups or 
individuals undergoing radicalization to violence. Broader social concerns 
within Muslim communities, such as discrimination, integration or socio-
                                                            
24 CLG Committee report, pp. 11-17 (note 19). 
25 Demos, p.13 (note 3). 
26 Maughan Brown, D., ‘Disingenous, Patronising and Dangerous’, guardian.co.uk, February 19th 2007, cited in 
The Runnymede Trust, The Runnymede Trust Response To The Role of Further Education Providers in 
Promoting Community Cohesion, Fostering Shared Values and Preventing Violent Extremism, May 6th 2008 
(http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/policyResponses/ComCohesionFE_response.pdf ) , article available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2007/feb/19/highereducation.uk1 (accessed August 5th 2010).  
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economic disadvantage, should not be part of a counter-terrorism agenda, 
as this serves to isolate communities.’27 
 
The danger of stigmatising communities and then to hurriedly address this fear 
through politically correct initiatives has served to entrench (rather than reign 
back) the scope of the Prevent agenda. This has been done, for example, by 
reassuring Muslim communities that contemporary ‘far right’ and animal rights 
extremism in the UK have now also become the focus of concern, alongside but 
separate to Prevent.28 Little wonder that further confusion has ensued as ‘we get 
vaguer in our targeting ... and yet we are sending out completely the wrong 
messages, both to the Muslim community who may think they are being tarred 
with a particular brush and to perhaps the wider community who are puzzled 
about what this programme is actually about’.29 
 
 
The notion of ‘vulnerability’ 
 
Along with the indeterminate scope of ‘radicalization’ is another label that lends 
itself to the broader remit of Prevent – that is the uncontested assumption 
widely disseminated by the government that actually the threat the UK is facing 
is from vulnerable people, in particular those ‘vulnerable to violent 
extremism’.30 Again, like the ‘radicalized’, the metric for determining who is 
vulnerable to violent extremism, or what makes them vulnerable, is difficult to 
determine with any confidence. Yet, aside from this, why is it that those who 
aim to commit terrorist acts are assumed to be vulnerable to violent extremism -
the idea that they have succumbed to (violent) extremist ideologies and that they 
need guidance so that they can be rescued from the manipulation of others 
(online or otherwise), and that they would not carry out such acts of their own 
volition. Hence the government’s ‘intention to provide early support to those 
who are being drawn into offending’ (italics added).31 
 
                                                            
27 Demos report, p. 15 (note 3). 
28 See ‘Delivering the Prevent Strategy: An Updated Guide for Local Partners’, August 2009, available at: 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/violentextremism/preventstrategy/downloads/2009%20Updated%20guide%20to%20loc
al%20partners.pdf (accessed August 11th 2010). 
29 Quilliam, cited in CLG Committee report, p. 21 (note 19). 
30 In the Contest 2 strategy document alone the words vulnerable and vulnerability (to describe those individuals 
vulnerable to violent extremism) were used no less than a total of 32 times (note 6). 
31 Contest 2, p. 89 (note 6). 
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But were the July 7th bombers really vulnerable? The conviction in Siddique 
Khan’s own words certainly did not suggest this: 
‘Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate 
atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them 
makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for 
protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel 
security, you will be our targets ...We are at war and I am a soldier.’32 
 
The 7/7 bombers were reported to have apparently led ‘ordinary’ lives with only 
Germaine Lindsay described as having an ‘unsettled life’.33 Indeed as far back 
as May 2006 the Intelligence and Security Committee report into 7/7 noted that 
‘that the threat is as likely to come from those who appear well assimilated into 
mainstream UK society, with jobs and young families, as from those within 
socially or economically deprived sections of the community.’34 Nor should the 
case of Nicky Reilly, who had the mental age of a young child and who tried to 
set off an explosive device in a restaurant in Exeter in May 2008, be seen as 
typical or as evidence of the general vulnerability of those who engage in 
violent extremism. The more credible (empirical) research on terrorists suggests 
that they are in general psychologically no different to the rest of us.35  
 
Such an interpretation of vulnerability matters because it lends itself to a 
broader spectrum of response concerned with potentially numerous ‘vulnerable’ 
individuals, and to the danger that traditionally non-security areas become 
securitised, such as community integration and cohesion. And if there is no 
                                                            
32 Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7th July 2005, May 2006, p. 
12 (available at: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/corp/assets/publications/reports/intelligence/isc_7july_rep
ort.pdf (accessed August 12th 2010). It is, of course, difficult to assess the degree that these international 
‘causes’ of Muslim ‘suffering’ are seen as genuine grievances rather than used as propaganda in a broader 
ideological struggle. The fundamental point, however, is that issues in the international realm have being 
exploited in order to perpetrate attacks in the UK.. 
33 ‘The bombers’, BBC News, (undated), available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/investigation/html/bombers.stm (accessed August 
12th). 
34 Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7th July 2005, May 2006, p. 
29 (note 32). 
35 See, for example, Crenshaw, M., ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July, 
1981), p. 390; Horgan, J., The Psychology of Terrorism, Routledge, 2005; Silke, A., ‘Becoming a Terrorist’, in 
Silke, A., (ed), Terrorists, Victims and Society, Wiley, 2003;Horgan, J., ‘The Search for the Terrorist 
Personality’, in Silke, A., (ed), Terrorists, Victims and Society, Wiley, 2003. 
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‘typical pathway to violent extremism’ then the ‘scope of risk-assessment is 
rendered potentially unlimited’ for British Muslims.36 
Thus, while the failure to be clear about the parameters as to what we mean by 
radicalization has facilitated a broader Prevent remit, so too has the notion of 
vulnerability to violent extremism, where the onus is apparently on 
communities to come together to redeem such individuals; and the vulnerability 
of not just individuals but communities37 logically assumes that ‘community 
resilience’ and ‘community cohesion’ will help to reduce the terrorist problem.38   
The impetus towards thinking of terrorism in the UK as the product and 
outcome of ‘vulnerability’, however, risks misunderstanding the terrorist 
problem and deflecting us from what has generally been agreed in terrorism 
studies – that terrorism involves the perpetration of rational and calculated acts 
of violence. This is not to suggest that one can’t be vulnerable (however 
defined) and rational39 at the same time but it appears that the possibility that 
terrorism at home could also be seen as a rational act by the perpetrators in 
response to British military action abroad seems to be entirely absent from 
governmental discourse.40 In this context one might be forgiven for thinking 
that the use of the term ‘vulnerable’ has been politically motivated to facilitate 
the notion that nobody in their right mind could possibly react in such a way to 
UK interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, that they must have been 
manipulated and that those that are being drawn into violent extremism (and are 
therefore not acting of their own rational volition) need our help and protection 
for their ‘recouperation’ into mainstream society. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has questioned the use of ‘radicalization’ as a focus of response 
with its varying parameters. Senior police officers engaged in Prevent still 
confide that they are unsure as to what exactly is meant by it. Its indeterminate 
                                                            
36 Institute for Policy Research and Development, cited in the CLG Committee report, p. 9 (note 19). 
37 Contest 2, p. 83 (note 6). 
38 See Githens-Mazer and Lambert, p. 900 (note 8), where the authors question the notion that integration and 
community cohesion is a relevant response to radicalization.  
39 Rationality is understood here to mean goal-orientated. 
40 For example, Prime Minister Blair was reluctant to acknowledge the impact of the Iraq war on the terrorist 
threat at home while Prime Minister Brown, in his justification for the British presence in Afghanistan as 
‘protecting British streets’, consistently failed to provide a more balanced assessment that would also have 
acknowledged the use of Afghanistan in Al Qaeda’s narrative and therefore its value in terms of propaganda and 
recruitment. 
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scope has helped to facilitate the broad remit of Prevent and the ‘unintended 
consequences’ of this has meant that in some ways Prevent has actually become 
counterproductive. While it has complicated the task of those engaged in 
community cohesion, it has also generated fears of stigmatising communities. In 
July 2010 it was proclaimed that ‘Prevent is dead: What next?’ and that it had 
become ‘as much about the government-inspired social engineering of 
integration as it was about stopping terrorist attacks.’ 41 Whatever its future, and 
the new government’s review of Prevent is pending in October 2010, it must 
refocus on preventing terrorism – not on fostering shared values, and not on 
promoting community integration or cohesion.  
‘Radicalization’ is a relatively new concept that has very much been a 
‘buzzword’ in counter-terrorism, policymaking and academic circles in the last 
five years. One often hears of the merits of ‘new thinking’ or ‘innovative 
thinking’ with all of its progressive connotations. But new thinking does not 
always mean better thinking. It transpires that radicalization has not been a 
particularly useful concept upon which to base a counter-terrorism response. 
There should now be a refocus on those that engage in, or actively support 
violent extremism, and not on ideas or what people think. This is not, however, 
to diminish broader, contextual or root cause factors behind terrorism but these 
factors should be considered for their causal impact on terrorism and not on 
broader notions of radicalization. Finally, the lesson for the new government’s 
‘Big Society’ is that counter-terrorism should not be conflated with other 
societal goals. 
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